## August 14pp 19 yed For Release 1999/09/17 RECORD - HOUSE

regard to Castro's activity in Latin America. Contributing to this is the concept of Russia as being terribly embarrassed by Castro's behavior.

We are told that Russia is really trying to build peaceful trade in Latin America and would like to disavow Castro and the use of violence as a means of revolution. News reports from the recent Havana meeting seemed to make it appear that differences of opinion between Castro and the Kremlin put the two right on the verge of a complete split.

Yet it would be exceedingly risky to conclude that Russia is suddenly reversing its longtime policy of support for violent revolution in Latin America. To do so would be to ignore the kind of duplicity the Kremlin has practiced con-

sistently for 25 years.

Differences of opinion between Castro and the Kremlin are quite possible, even probable. So is the Russian desire for trade in Latin America. But these by no means should be interpreted as evidence that Russia has changed basic objectives. Such an interpretation is the kind of illusion, leading to the paralysis of U.S. policy, which is one of the goals of Russian policy.

These facts stand out for all to see:

First. As recently as May 21 of this year, 13 days after the most recent Cuban aggression against Venezuela, and time enough for Russia to determine that the OAS was either unable or unwilling to take any action to counter it, the Kremlin repeated its support for violent revolution as practiced by Castroite Latin American "patriots."

On that day a long article in Pravda made very clear that Russia backs not only constitutional methods of revolution

but guerrilla struggle as well.

Second. Russia's full support of the aims of the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana in January 1961, and of the conference itself, was a significant move in terms of the international call to violence which the Conference represented.

Third. Russia supports Cuba right now with about \$1 million each day in supplies of various kinds including military

equipment.

Fourth. In June, Premier Kosygin made Russia's position clear again when he said his government is continuing to support "wars of national liberation." He made the statement in New York at the Sunday evening televised news conference, just minutes after conferring with President Johnson. A few hours later Mr. Kosygin was conferring with Castro in Havana.

Fifth. Russia is using its powerful intercontinental radio transmitters to beam inflammatory radio propaganda into the Americas every day and night, giving additional support to the Castro

brand of violent revolution.

Sixth. There are evidently thousands of Russians in Cuba today engaged in training and equipping the Cuban army in the use of advanced weapons and advanced military and communication equipment.

The Russian presence in Cuba today should recollect the critical situation presented to us in the days just prior to the missile crisis of 1962.

INCREASING WARFARE

As the United States and the rest of the non-Communist world watch, guerrilla warfare throughout many areas of Latin America is steadily increasing in scope and intensity.

It cannot and need not be detailed in a statement here, but we should be aware that this guerrilla warfare is proceeding in accord with stated Communist objectives. It was outlined in a recent book by Jules Regis Debray, the French-born guerrilla specialist, colleague of Castro's who has been arrested by the Bolivian police for inciting subversion in that country.

Debray indicates that Che Guevara is leading guerrilla fighters in Bolivia and perhaps in neighboring areas as well. In virtually every Latin American country today there is a group of guerrillas trained in Cuba, equipped partly from Cuba, and in radio contact with Cuba.

Their presence is especially obvious in Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala. In the past few days reports from Mexico indicate guerrilla activity there, with 55 persons detained as suspects.

PROPOSALS

These conditions merit the full and close attention of all Americans and of the Congress, and particularly the administration. The time for watching and waiting has passed. The time for effective action has come.

I would hope and expect that once the American people come to recognize the extent of the problem, the Government will come forth with appropriate action. As part of a possible course I want here to present some proposals which I believe deserve early consideration.

1. REBUILD THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The NSC was established after World War II for the purpose of preparing and presenting recommendations to the President on matters of national security on a comprehensive basis, including domestic, foreign, and military policies

estic, foreign, and military policies.

• Presidents Truman and Eisenhower utilized the NSC effectively, both in terms of long range security planning and

management of crisis situations.

In November of 1961 a Senate subcommittee on national policy machinery, under the chairmanship of Senator Henry M. Jackson, presented a report entitled "Organizing for National Security." One of the major recommendations of the report was even more utilization of the NSC.

Ironically, from that point until today the Kennedy and Johnson administrations have moved in exactly the opposite direction and allowed the NSC to fall into almost complete disuse. Today the NSC is virtually nonexistent.

Crisis management is handled on a hip-pocket basis, with hunches providing the basis for major decisions. Long range planning, whatever there is, lacks coordination between agencies and departments.

The National Security Council must be rebuilt as a functioning, active, responsible policy tool of the Presidency.

2. MEET THE GUERRILIA WARFARE PROBLEM

The first major project of a revitalized NSC might well be the establishment of

a subgroup for the purpose of a continuing study of "wars of national liberation" to determine how our national security may be affected, and what steps, if any, this country should take.

This advisory committee, or subgroup, by whatever name it is called, should include representatives of four government agencies: Department of Defense, State Department, CIA, and USIA.

But the makeup of the group should go beyond the existing Government structure to bring in members representing the very extensive body of knowledge, experience and dedication in this field existing outside the Federal Government structure.

Existing Government departments would likely object to this concept, but there are today in business, education, journalism, and other sectors of private life great numbers of individuals who are both willing and qualified to make contributions of this kind. Some of them should be utilized.

3. GIVE THE USIA A NEW POLICY DIRECTION

The U.S. Information Agency has served the Government steadily since the Truman administration as the means by which this country explains itself to the world. However, its role has never been given a thorough examination in the light of changing conditions since its early periods.

The most critical element in the world today is psychological. We are involved in a gigantic war of words and pictures where the objectives are the minds of men and women. Yet U.S. foreign policy programs apparently do not yet give adequate recognition to this fact.

Our foreign information program as engineered by the USIA is virtually the same today as it was years ago before anyone had heard the phrase "war of national liberation."

The Voice of America and other media branches of the USIA are essentially acting as reporters of the news as found in the newspapers.

Serious consideration should be given to a major shift in USIA policy toward more active selling of the U.S. position. It should actively promote U.S. policy and should state more forcefully and effectively just exactly how the United States seeks stability among all peoples of the world.

This change in direction of USIA would not at all mean an increase in expenditures or numbers of employees. To the contrary it might mean less cost and a more streamlined staff.

This project might be accomplished either through the revitalized NSC or by some other means, but it must be accomplished if we are to have a real hope of retaining national security in today's world.

4. STRENGTHEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

President Kennedy was quoted as saying that the State Department most nearly resembles a bowl of jelly. In recent years the Department appears to have become even less effective: incapable of providing any kind of worthwhile initiative in policy leadership.